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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY AND THE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT: SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS FOR LIBERAL 
COSMOPOLITANS 
 
 
In recent years the intellectual resources of mainstream liberal political theory have 
been increasingly applied to environmental issues, and, of late, especially to those 
associated with climate change.  That such issues are no longer treated as marginal 
concerns with respect to established agendas of political theory is a very welcome 
development. Nevertheless, I believe it is worth asking whether contemporary 
environmental concerns should in fact occasion a more radical questioning of 
inherited liberal framings of political theory – especially as questions of international 
and global relations come to the fore. 
In the face of global challenges – particularly widespread severe poverty and 
environmental threats – contemporary political theorists are seeking to formulate 
cosmopolitan responses. While endorsing this cosmopolitan impulse, my critical 
questions concern the continued formulation of these responses within established 
liberal framings of political theory. Two major changes of context have occurred 
since liberalism came to maturity. First, the theory and practice of liberalism 
developed before awareness arose of environmental constraints on economic activity, 
and on the basis of presuppositions which those constraints serve to undermine. 
Second, liberalism developed historically with nation-states and thus prior to serious 
consideration of global, cosmopolitan, politics – as distinct from the international 
relations between those states as the primary and usually sole locus of sovereign 
power.  To refer to these developments as changes of context is perhaps to understate 
the issue. For they could be thought such as to challenge certain fundamental, even 
constitutive, presuppositions of liberalism.  
This, then, is the first general question to consider: what reason is there to 
presume that liberalism provides a suitable framing for political theory relating to 
global justice and the environment?  In section 1 I aim to loosen this presumption by 
highlighting how liberalism as a whole is rather ambivalent with regard to both sets of 
issue. Regarding global justice, specifically, there are strong liberal arguments against 
cosmopolitanism. I suggest that if there are stronger arguments to be advanced against 
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these in favour of cosmopolitanism then they might have to be supported by premises 
other than liberal ones.  To provide a focus for this suggestion, I point out how 
cosmopolitanism might better be promoted within a socialist framing.  
Having thus questioned why liberalism would necessarily provide an 
appropriate framing for global justice, I then question whether it is any more 
appropriate for framing global environmental issues. In section 2, the specific focus is 
on the idea of sustainable development and liberal understandings of it. The aim of 
sustainable development has been widely endorsed because, I suggest, its usual 
interpretation conveniently implies the possibility of a win-win-win scenario for 
protecting the environment while at the same time securing economic development 
and promoting global justice.  Yet the truth may be less convenient, given the evident 
tensions between these objectives in practice: as economic development continues, 
the global environment deteriorates and global inequalities intensify.  For that reason, 
I argue, we need also to attend to the losses and costs already associated with this 
development model. On this basis, it is more appropriate to reframe the aims relating 
to global environmental justice in terms of ecological debt. This reframing represents 
a challenge to liberal understandings of “sustainable development”.  
 This argument leads us then to ask critical questions about the empirical 
assumptions made in liberal theory regarding the material, biophysical, basis of global 
political economy. Section 3 thus begins by asking what must be assumed when 
liberal cosmopolitans propose, for instance, globalising Rawls’s difference principle. 
For the application of such a principle appears to presuppose that justice means 
sharing more fairly the proceeds of ever-increasing wealth as are generated by a 
globally liberalised economy. This fosters the same idea it presupposes: that 
liberalism will ultimately be good for everyone, providing only that we ensure some 
redistribution of surplus value.  This general idea seems also to underpin various 
suggestions made by contemporary political theorists that relatively modest reforms 
of international institutions may suffice to secure basic justice for all, including the 
eradication of world poverty. Once we heed the ecological constraints on growth of 
the productive economy, however, the basis of this faith is called into question. 
The arguments thus far highlight ambivalences and uncertainties about 
liberalism – which are in good measure due to its own internal tensions, particularly 
	3
between its progressive ethical goals and its morally more troubling association with 
capitalism. In Section 4 I raise some questions about how progressive in fact is a 
distinctively liberal construction of ethical goals in the contemporary circumstances 
of global justice when these importantly include recognition of ecological finitude.  I 
question the extent to which peculiarly liberal values should be preserved by 
cosmopolitanism, and focus in particular on the argument that what present 
circumstances require is an ethos of restraint and that this, in key respects, is the 
antithesis of a liberal ethos. 
In conclusion, I sum up how, taking human rights as the fundamental 
normative touchstone, we can develop an account of what global justice requires in 
the light of ecological constraints that is recognizably cosmopolitan but at variance 
from liberal understandings of cosmopolitanism in key respects. 
 
1. Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice 
Today there is an influential current of thought that conceives of cosmopolitan 
justice as a globalisation of liberal principles: as Anthony J Langlois notes, “much of 
what goes by the name of contemporary cosmopolitanism is liberalism envisioned at 
the global level.”i  What gives coherence to this vision, he states, is the core of values 
associated with human rights. But there is a tension within it: while affirming a basic 
liberal right to own private property as a way of protecting the individual, Langlois 
notes it is also important in the liberal tradition that individuals who have less as a 
consequence of economic structures should be protected from the power of those 
better situated by virtue of their private property rights. He conceptualises the tension 
here as one between political liberals, who “have a focus on the commonwealth, the 
common good,” and economic liberals whose focus on individual self maximization 
translates into a concern about market advantage.   What is distinctive about political 
liberalism, then, is a kind of commitment that economic liberals would presumably 
struggle to recognize as liberal at all.  
I think Langlois’s view fairly reflects that of many liberal cosmopolitans. The 
tension within it is one that is familiar from the history of liberal thought. Political 
liberals have a moral vision, captured by what C.B. Macpherson saw as the essential 
	4
meaning of liberal democracy: “a society striving to ensure that all its members are 
equally free to realize their capabilities.”ii  This vision, he thought, could be 
dissociated from liberal democracy in the sense of “the democracy of a capitalist 
market society”: “a liberal position need not be taken to depend forever on an 
acceptance of capitalist assumptions, although historically it has been so taken.” 
What I think we can consider a distinctively liberal view, quite generally, is the 
belief that this dichotomy between ethico-political liberalism and economic 
liberalism is in some way satisfactorily manageable and not problematic in any 
radical sense. It involves a belief that whatever criticisms might be directed against 
economic liberalism as the ideological counterpart of capitalism, the values of 
“ethical” liberalism or principles of “political” liberalism are immune from any 
implications of those criticisms. 
A defining feature of liberalism is thus that it does not have a constitutive 
objective of ending capitalism’s endless pursuit of accumulation. It may aim to make 
capitalism more “benign,” for instance through policies geared to distributive justice; 
and some left-leaning liberals may even emphasise their non-objection to the ending 
of capitalism, but there is no sense in which they would hasten it. 
Thus what “liberalism” means can in part be expounded from the perspective 
of critics who would contrast it with socialism.  On such accounts liberalism is a 
political ideology which serves to legitimate subservience to the capitalist market 
either nakedly (e.g. neoliberalism) or more insidiously by expounding moral 
principles that will never get traction. C Wright Mills, for instance, wrote: “The ideals 
of liberalism have been divorced from any realities of modern social structure that 
might serve as the means of their realization. … if the moral force of liberalism is still 
stimulating, its sociological content is weak; it has no theory of society adequate to its 
moral aims.”iii   
Now this charge may seem overstated in relation to more recent liberal theory.  
John Rawls, for instance, was very clear that “ethical principles depend upon general 
facts and therefore a theory of justice for the basic structure presupposes an account 
of these [political economic] arrangements.”iv  Rawls believed that an adequate 
sociological understanding was available for his purposes. Accordingly, however, he 
	5
was also clear that his normative theory applies to a well-defined context – that of a 
modern liberal democratic state. 
 Given that liberal cosmopolitanism precisely aims at transcending the nation-
state context, Wright Mills’s criticism regains pertinence: how is the moral theory 
related to socio-economic or political realities? But now the question is posed from 
within liberalism. Liberal critics of cosmopolitanism argue broadly as follows: 
1. Normative theorising and theories of justice presuppose an account of basic 
socio-economic facts about the context to which the theory applies.  
2. Liberal political theory presupposes facts of liberal democratic states. 
3. Not all states are liberal democratic states, and the world as a whole is not a 
liberal democratic state. 
Therefore: 
4. normative liberal political theory cannot simply be applied or extended to the 
whole world without, minimally, reviewing the factual assumptions it originally 
presupposed.   
Rawls himself was clear on this point and developed the quite separate normative 
theory of international relations presented in his The Law of Peoples. 
 So how do things stand with liberal cosmopolitanism? To answer this we need 
to observe the distinction drawn by Charles Beitz between “moral cosmopolitanism” 
and “institutional cosmopolitanism”.  The former is a moral philosophy that 
presupposes little specifically about the socio-economic facts of the world; rather, it 
takes its bearings from the moral status of individuals. Correspondingly, it implies 
nothing very particular about institutional arrangements. If cosmopolitanism is 
understood purely as a moral position, then, it is not even inconsistent with 
nationalism.v  As David Miller put it, if this “weak” interpretation is all there is to it 
then “we are all cosmopolitans now.”vi 
Let us, then, consider what is required of “strong” cosmopolitanism: 
5. Cosmopolitanism as a normative theory applies to the whole world at the level 
of basic institutions.   
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6. To apply, the theory must presuppose an account of the facts of the whole world, 
including, importantly, economic facts. 
7. One possible account of the facts is that of liberal international relations theory. 
8. But (at least according to Rawls and others) this account does not support strong 
cosmopolitanism. 
It would follow, then, that either Rawls gets liberal international relations theory quite 
seriously wrong or else strong cosmopolitanism must depend on some alternative 
account of the facts.  
Political theorists who are consistent in their liberalism – and these include not 
only Rawls and his followers, but also people like Miller or Michael Walzer – argue 
that there are no grounds for strong cosmopolitanism.  Samuel Freeman captures the 
problem: “what bothers many cosmopolitans is that global capitalism has created 
ways to elude political control by the world’s governments … and part of the problem 
is that there is no global basic structure to deal with it.”vii  It is no solution to advert to 
the moral interpretation of cosmopolitanism, for the problem is precisely the want of 
adequately cosmopolitan institutions. “It is a serious failing of cosmopolitan accounts 
of distributive justice that they discount the significance of social cooperation and 
regard distributive justice as asocial and apolitical.”viii Leif Wenar criticises 
cosmopolitans’ “insistence upon radical distributive principles without a prior 
demonstration that they can validate the most fundamental norms of global 
stability.”ix  
 But if critics of liberal cosmopolitanism seem clearer than its advocates about 
what the challenge is, this should not mean they have the last word. Since Wenar cites 
Brian Barry in support of his concluding message – that in the global arena “the 
problem of establishing a peaceful order eclipses all others”x – I shall defer to the 
same authority. What Brian Barry has contributed to global justice debates is, I 
believe, a salutary dose of realism.  Contrary to what Wenar implies, Barry’s position 
does not entail a rejection of cosmopolitanism but rather of the illusions of liberal 
constructions of it.  In his essay “The Continuing Relevance of Socialism,” Barry 
writes that “the transformation from a society ruled by the tyranny of the market to 
one of freedom requires collective control over the economy.”xi  Whereas the tyranny 
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of the market under global capitalism is not in principle challenged by liberals, Barry 
articulates the redistributive cosmopolitan case in terms that challenge the basic 
assumptions of a liberal framing of international relations: “industrial countries have 
achieved their present prosperity by first using their own natural resources and then, 
when these began to get scarce, by using those of the rest of the world at relatively 
low cost to themselves… In effect, this bonanza has been turned into accumulated 
capital that is regarded by these countries as their private property to do with as they 
choose.”xii  Poor countries meanwhile have been left at a significant disadvantage in 
international economic relations.  Thus on the question of securing a peaceful world 
order, it is not obvious that cosmopolitans should acquiesce in the liberal perspective.  
Darrel Moellendorf, for instance, offers an alternative perspective: 
 “The problem is that constitutional democracies with capitalist economies contain 
a system of incentives for persons with business interests in other states to 
advocate the use of state power to protect those interests. In other words, such 
states contain a class of people who have an interest in imperialist wars. Imperialist 
wars are externalities of a system in which profits accrue to private individuals. 
The only way to remove these externalities is through the establishment of an 
economic system that is not primarily based upon the profit motive or one that 
institutes public control over profits.”xiii  
Thus Moellendorf recognizes that “socialist states may be a desirable goal of an 
egalitarian world order.”xiv 
So cosmopolitans can share Wenar’s view about the indispensability of a 
peaceful order and yet take a different view of what its accomplishment might entail. 
Rather than trust in the idealist tenets of liberal peace coming eventually to be shared 
by all peoples through the beneficent workings of a “truly free market,” 
cosmopolitanism potentially challenges the adequacy of liberal theory’s construction 
of the facts of global political economy. Yet this is the break that liberal 
cosmopolitans in the tradition of Beitz and Pogge have refrained from completing.xv 
Their reason being, I think, that it involves entertaining explanatory hypotheses – 
such as those of world systems theory, for instancexvi –  that are highly controversial 
within a liberal worldview and are strongly resisted by liberal critics of 
cosmopolitanism.  At any rate, if “explanatory nationalism” is inadequate, this implies 
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there must be a better explanatory theory to account for the contemporary 
circumstances of justice globally. But instead of showing how liberal theory is over-
optimistic about the cooperative character of international political and economic 
relations, and thereby focussing on the necessary preconditions still to be achieved for 
a more just world order, the liberal cosmopolitans promote what is arguably an even 
more optimistic view of international relations as a “cooperative scheme” analogous 
to that of a modern nation-state.  To suggest there is a “basic structure” globally 
equivalent to that presupposed by Rawls for a liberal democratic state – if this is 
understood as referring to a set of constitutionally and politically governed institutions 
– is tantamount to saying institutional cosmopolitanism is already a reality. This 
would be liberal political theory becoming once more a moral philosophy cut adrift 
from moorings in socio-economic explanation. 
However, the need to liberate cosmopolitanism from liberal assumptions 
becomes even clearer when we consider the global environmental context. Here we 
may find reason to appreciate Barry’s claim that if the critique of capitalism implies 
socialism, then socialism, in turn, provides “the essential intellectual framework for 
environmental concerns.”xvii  
 
2. Liberalism and the global environment: sustainable development or ecological 
debt? 
As the other contributions to this special issue testify, appropriate political responses 
to global environmental threats have to appreciate their connection to matters of 
global justice. In light of this, I pose the question of why it should be anticipated that 
liberalism would be a necessary part of an appropriate response. 
Various authors have discussed how liberalism can be compatible with 
environmental values.  A major focus of their attention in arguing this is on how 
liberalism can – despite apparent presumptions to the contrary – accommodate non-
instrumental value of non-human nature.xviii  I do not think we should be surprised to 
find that liberalism can accommodate a very wide range of ideas, including those of 
environmentalists and ecologists. The touchstone of liberalism as a moral philosophy 
is, after all, toleration.  It is a relatively easy matter for reasonable people (at least 
	9
when they find themselves in circumstances propitious to reasonableness) to reach 
broad agreement on desirable goals, and the recent liberal accommodation of 
environmental goals would be a case in point.  But what is desirable has in practice 
also to be conditioned by what is possible, and this may provide a sterner test of the 
compatibility of liberal and environmental values- of how well liberal principles can 
be pressed into service of the aim of securing a decent environment, when that is 
understood, especially, as a global environment.  
Liberal political theorists – indeed, like businesses and politicians of various 
stripes as well as publics – have had little difficulty in embracing the goal of 
“sustainable development” as articulated in the Brundtland Report some twenty years 
ago.xix Brundtland’s idea of sustainable development held out the appealing aspiration 
of international cooperation being able to protect the environment while at the same 
time securing economic development and promoting global justice.   
Yet the tensions between these objectives remain all too evident: as economic 
development continues, the global environment deteriorates and global inequalities 
intensify. The benefits of development carry serious environmental costs and are 
unjustly distributed. We have to recognize that the question of what it means to 
pursue sustainable development cannot be answered simply in terms of the benefits 
aimed at. We need to attend to the costs involved in achieving them and to the issue 
of their just distribution.  For either the costs are borne equitably or those who are 
already victims of human rights deficits suffer worse.  
 The most fundamental norm proposed by Brundtland was that every person 
has a fundamental human right to live in an environment adequate for their health and 
well-being.xx  The achievement of this right, for every person, would involve a more 
radical transformation of global relations than seems to be supposed in most 
discussions of sustainable development.  For it cannot be achieved without also 
achieving a range of basic social rights; yet the environment also sets constraints on 
economic activity in the aggregate, and thus on the generation of the wherewithal to 
fulfil those rights.  Considering the conditions of possibility of its achievement would 
thus suggest a profound challenge to the system of private property rights which 
allows some to draw immense profit from the world’s natural resources while others 
are deprived of even the basic necessities of life.   
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This implication, that full respect for all human rights, indivisibly, involves a 
fundamental challenge to the existing order of property rights worldwide, is not 
generally foregrounded in discussions of sustainability.  The dominant ethos remains 
that of liberalisation, premised on the idea that we can all become better off - the rich 
raising standards so that the poor benefit too.  
Yet the situation is that developed countries benefit from the use of more 
natural resources and environmental services than is either ecologically sustainable or 
arguably, especially in light of global inequalities, their due share.  From the 
perspective of developing countries, we can be accused of running an “ecological 
debt.” The idea of ecological debt refers to the myriad ways that human societies 
today, both separately and in the aggregate, live, so to speak, beyond their ecological 
means.  Ecological debt accrues whenever resources are taken out of their natural 
state at a rate faster than they can naturally be renewed, or when pollutants are 
emitted at a rate faster than they can naturally be assimilated. Allegations of 
ecological debt can be understood as claims that there is an unjust distribution of 
rights in the planet’s various natural resources and environmental services. The 
allocation of rights is certainly haphazard: international law accommodates an array 
of property and sovereignty rights which have arisen historically as products of 
unregulated exploitation, wars, colonialism, power politics, ad hoc negotiations, and, 
in the best of cases, multilateral treaty agreements.  Meanwhile, as international 
institutions create new rights - for example, carbon emissions rights or intellectual 
property rights in genetic resources - old rights, and particularly rights of territorial 
sovereignty, are being significantly modified.  How just these regimes are, 
individually or in the aggregate, is a central question for assessing allegations of 
ecological debt. The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the estimate that to 
sustain the world’s population at the current consumption levels of the affluent would 
actually require the resources of three additional Planet Earths. Even the current 
aggregate consumption level, which includes that of some billion people who exist in 
absolute poverty, is not sustainable. From this perspective, it appears that in myriad 
ways the affluent are “ecological debtors” who actively deprive the planet’s poorer 
peoples of their “fair share” of the earth’s ecological space. 
 This perspective is not a liberal one.  Liberals, whether cosmopolitan or 
nationalist, envisage, at most, a more equitable sharing of economic benefits, but not 
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any more radical questioning of the justifiability of the benefits themselves. To assess 
why it might be considered permissible to disregard such questions, we need to 
consider what can reasonably be presupposed about the general circumstances of 
justice in a globally liberalising world. 
 
3. What do liberals assume about global political economy? 
Historically, liberal political theory developed in conjunction with the theory and 
practice of liberal political economy. The latter provided important elements of 
empirical reference that could be assumed as the context of application for normative 
theory. Today, as liberal cosmopolitans attempt to adapt their political theory to 
changing contexts, the relation of that theory to any determinate understanding of 
political economy is becoming increasingly uncertain. 
To take an illustration, when liberal cosmopolitans argue for a global 
extension of Rawls’s difference principle, they tend to neglect what I think is a 
crucial question: If this principle is supposed to operate so that the affluent are 
incentivised to maintain economic growth provided that the poor can benefit too, and 
all this is subject moreover to a “just savings principle”, how is that growth in fact 
going to be maintained, let alone something saved, when the consequences of 
economic growth to date are already - as is now, belatedly, recognized - threatening 
the very biophysical basis of human life on this planet?  
The question as posed is of course an empirical one, and normative political 
philosophers do not establish socio-economic facts. But they do choose the empirical 
presuppositions which give meaning and application to their theories. Rawls himself, 
for instance, when unfolding his theory of justice, expressly assumed that persons 
who deliberate competently about principles of justice “know the general facts about 
human society”, “understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory” 
and “know the basis of social organization.”xxi In the domestic context of a modern 
democratic state with a relatively stable socio-economic order such an assumption 
may have appeared quite serviceable.  But what comparable assumption about taken-
for-granted knowledge and understanding can we make in the global context today? 
In particular, should we choose to assume that continued economic growth, on the 
part of the West, plus all the developing countries, is possible indefinitely without 
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causing any serious ecological disruption that would undermine its advance? Or 
should we choose to be sceptical about that possibility? 
This choice can be characterized as one between a ‘cornucopian’ assumption 
and an assumption that that distribution of access to the world’s resources is 
somewhat closer to a ‘zero-sum’ game.xxii 
To date, most international political theorists have not been very explicit 
about whether they accept or deny the cornucopian presumption.  One who does is 
Loren E Lomasky, who states that “The world’s wealth is not zero-sum, and thus to 
consume more is not to visit a harm on those who consume less.”xxiii  Problems of 
poverty on his account are due to incompetent and corrupt regimes. If rich states 
have some responsibility for global injustices, it is not due to “insufficient zeal in 
applying the difference principle beyond borders.  Rather, the flaw is rooted more 
deeply in a transgression against the grounding theory of liberalism: denial of equal 
liberty to those with whom one transacts.”xxiv So, it emerges, the solution is the 
complete opening of borders to free trade and movement of people within a 
framework of rule of law that provides well-defined property rights. The universalist 
strand in liberal philosophy only needs to be put into practice with a more complete 
liberalizing of the world market. Lomasky’s view is, from an ecological point of 
view, even more retrogressive than that of those who advocate globalising the 
difference principle: the latter recognize at least that wealth distribution requires 
some institutional intervention; on Lomasky’s it would appear to be expected as a 
natural consequence of further freeing up markets. This expectation does not appear 
to have any clear warrant in terms of evidence to date; moreover, regarding the 
question of presuppositions, it is important to note that in the initial statement quoted 
Lomasky’s reasoning is fallacious. It is true that the world’s wealth is not zero-sum; 
however at any given time its amount is determinate and finite; and if we add to this 
fact the consideraton that it is very unevenly distributed, then we can see that the 
opposite conclusion to Lomasky’s can be drawn, namely, that the high consumers 
can very well visit harm on the worst off by marginal increases in their own 
consumption.   
 Now I am sure that many liberals will contend that Lomasky’s libertarian 
view is not a view of liberalism one needs to accept. But my question is whether 
there is a comparably clear alternative view of liberal theory’s assumptions regarding 
political economy. Others may place less faith in the market’s capacity to deliver 
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material equity, yet I am not aware of any significant strand of liberal thinking that 
decisively challenges the cornucopian presumption.   
In fact, I believe there is an uneasy agnosticism about this question among 
normative theorists who for the most part, accordingly, simply avoid it. Yet the 
question goes to a very basic issue about the material circumstances of justice 
globally. In what follows, therefore, I consider two lines of resistance against the 
ecological critique of the cornucopian assumption. The first involves asking whether 
criticism of cornucopianism really is in fact relevant as a criticism of liberalism; the 
second is whether cornucopianism can anyway be defended against ecological 
criticism. 
 i) Is criticism of cornucopianism relevant as a criticism of liberalism? One 
potential reason why not would be the following. It is not natural resources that 
matter most fundamentally for justice, but a well-ordered society; and the amount of 
natural resources required to support good social order is not so great as to require 
the indefinite demands implied by the critique of cornucopianism. Therefore 
liberalism, conceived as primarily concerned with implementing a liberal theory of 
justice, does not need to make the cornucopian assumption.  However, this line of 
reasoning does not do more than offer a defence of the agnosticism referred to. It 
leaves unanswered some questions that are salient even within its own terms of 
reference: if natural resources are assumed to be of limited relevance, where are the 
limits and how are they maintained, and what would happen if they were 
overstepped? Of wider significance is the point that this reasoning is deployed by 
those liberals who resist the cosmopolitan generalisation of liberal principles.  
Liberal cosmopolitans, by contrast, do not accept that less advantaged nations should 
have to settle for significantly less in terms of resources than do the affluent. They 
cannot therefore consistently appeal to this argument. 
 A different line of reasoning, however, has been canvassed, for instance, by 
the liberal environmentalist Mark Sagoff.xxv  Sagoff sets out reasons to be sceptical 
about whether natural resources matter particularly for global justice.  For not only is 
what is needed not necessarily natural resources, but, more crucially, to the extent 
that what is needed has a natural resource component, it is not scarce.  On this view – 
which is that of mainstream economists – what is needed is ingenuity and 
knowledge; these overcome scarcity. Therefore a biophysical perspective on the 
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economy – that which generates the critique of cornucopianism – is largely beside 
the point: 
“Quantitative increase in the physical dimension of the economy is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for economic growth in the conventional sense, which has 
to do with the value of production rather than the physical size of whatever is 
produced or consumed.”xxvi  
Now in response it has certainly to be agreed that the “value” of production 
does not have any uniquely determinable correlation with the biophysical dimension 
of the economy, and so we cannot claim that economic growth necessarily entails any 
particular increase in biophysical loads.  Any such connection in practice would be 
contingent on the character of the economy rather than the manifestation of a 
necessary truth in any metaphysical or logical sense. It is thus indeed conceivable that 
an economy could be so predominantly service-based, for instance, that any such 
contingent connection was absent.xxvii It is also conceivable that an economy could be 
so ecologically efficient that the connection was absent.  However, we should not 
disregard the difference between what is conceivable and what is actual.  In actuality, 
economic growth is invariably accompanied by increased biophysical pressures.  So 
empirical actuality is to date certainly different from what is implied by the 
hypotheses that Sagoff conceives. Certainly, the hypothesis that natural resources 
matter for justice is not refuted merely by showing that alternative hypotheses can be 
conceived.  So the critique of cornucopianism is not irrelevant.  Still, it might be 
argued to fail. 
 ii) So what of the second line of argument, that cornucopianism can anyway 
be defended against ecological criticism? The argument here is that even if natural 
resources might matter, they are nevertheless not finite, or at least not as limited in 
availability as the ecological approach has to suppose they are to support a principled 
critique of liberalism’s presuppositions. This argument goes beyond the claim that 
economic growth could conceivably be sustained within natural limits to challenge the 
idea of natural limits itself.  Sagoff locates this claim at the core of liberal economic 
thought: “Mainstream economists, such as James Tobin, Robert Solow, and William 
B. Nordhaus, typically state that nature sets no limits to economic growth. Trusting to 
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human intelligence and ingenuity as people seek to satisfy their preferences and 
achieve well-being, these economists argue that people can choose among an 
indefinitely large number of alternatives.”xxviii This view as stated amounts simply to 
an article of faith – ‘trusting to human intelligence and ingenuity’. Can it draw on 
more persuasive support?  
Sagoff notes three arguments offered by mainstream economists to show that 
knowledge and ingenuity are likely always to alleviate resource shortages. First, 
reserves of natural resources “themselves are actually functions of technology.  The 
more advanced the technology, the more reserves become known and recoverable.”  
However, while there is some truth in this, the new reserves themselves stand to be 
consumed, and we cannot expect that ingenuity will create more reserves once all 
have been discovered and exploited, which is what would need to be the case to 
support the mainstream position. This, though, is where the second argument comes 
in: “advances in technology allow us not only to increase available reserves but also 
to employ substitutes for resources that may become scarce.” Again, there is some 
truth in this, but not enough: for it is debatable whether all resources can or should be 
substituted; it is also often the case that the substitution itself involves heavy use of 
other natural resources – as for instance, when plastics or chemical fertilizers 
requiring heavy use of fossil fuels substitute for naturally occurring materials. More 
decisively, as a supposed refutation of ultimate natural limits, it again does not appear 
to be an argument as such, since it merely asserts that substitutes will always be 
available, the thought underlying it being encapsulated in a restatement of faith “that 
in the aggregate resources are infinite, that when one flow dries up, there will always 
be another, and that technology will always find cheap ways to exploit the next 
resource.”xxix  Yet although this sentence uses the word “always,” the actual reports 
cited in evidence refer to a rather shorter time horizon: “the world is not yet running 
out of most nonrenewable resources and is not likely to, at least in the next few 
decades.”xxx  Clearly, the ecological economists’ claim that resource depletion cannot 
continue indefinitely is not refuted by the observation that it can nevertheless continue 
for some decades yet.  While the amount of ecological space available is partly 
contingent on the efficiency with which natural resources are exploited, this only 
means that the “natural limits” to resource exploitation cannot be fixed with precision 
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once and for all. It would be a non sequitur to conclude from this, however, that there 
are no such limits.  
Before turning to the third argument, it is worth emphasising that the question 
of natural limits is not merely a technical one but also has profound implications in 
the sphere of global justice.  For it is not just a question, as some suppose, of whether  
“we confront an age of scarcity in the near or, at best, the medium term.” The actual 
problem is both more mundane and more immediately pressing: natural limits to 
economic growth are mediated by complex socio-economic arrangements that 
produce wide disparities of outcomes. We only need to consider the plight of those 
millions who have lost lives, livelihoods and homes through famine, disease or 
environmental displacement to recognize that these vast populations have already 
encountered natural limits.  Thus the claim that there is a problem of natural limits is 
not refuted by the observation that the rich can for the time being stave off the most 
serious effects of it for themselves.  
This point is highly salient regarding the third argument offered by mainstream 
economists against the idea of natural limits. This is “that the power of knowledge 
continually reduces the amounts of resources needed to produce a constant or 
increasing flow of consumer goods and services.”xxxi  As evidence, Sagoff notes that 
“Societies with big gross domestic products, such as Sweden, protect nature, while 
nations in the former Soviet bloc with much smaller gross domestic products, such as 
Poland, have devastated their environments.”xxxii  However, even leaving aside the 
point that Sweden’s territorial endowment of resources per capita is something like 
three times that of Poland, a fact which somewhat compromises this particular 
comparison, there are more general critical observations to make about the claim that 
economic growth ultimately serves to protect the environment.   
In support of this claim there has been much attention devoted in the literature 
to the hypothesis of an “Environmental Kuznets Curve.”xxxiii According to this 
hypothesis, during the process of economic development, countries tend to increase 
consumption of energy and materials at the same rate as growth in income, until a 
certain level of income is reached; beyond that point further increases in the level of 
output will no longer be followed by increases (at the same rate) of energy and 
material consumption.  However, while there is evidence that a level of economic 
	17
growth can bring with it a reduction of material and energy inputs per unit of output, 
this stops a long way short of supporting the general claim that growth is “good for 
the environment,” as does evidence that richer countries tend to protect their territorial 
environments better than poorer countries.  For one thing, ecological efficiency gains 
per unit of output do not translate into greater environmental protection if growth of 
aggregate consumption more than offsets them, which it tends to for reasons inherent 
in the dynamics of growth. For another, even to the extent that a de-linking of growth 
and environmental degradation does occur, it is only after the country has reached a 
threshold of income and consumption of energy and materials per capita which is 
such a high one that it could not be emulated by all countries in the world without 
provoking likely ecological collapse in the meantime. Moreover, recent research has 
suggested that even if developed countries may go through a dematerialisation phase, 
they can also then go through a re-materialisation phase – so the inverted U-shaped 
curve would then appear as an N-shaped one, just depending on the time window used 
for observation.  But the most fundamental criticism of this hypothesis is that it 
simply disregards how countries benefiting from economic growth can effectively 
export their environmental problems. When account is taken of how the rich nations 
can “externalise” the most polluting factors of production, the very basis of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis is called into question. 
Empirical evidence showing that developed countries have improved their 
environments while growing their economies could only be held to support the econo-
mists’ conclusion if it could also be shown that no appreciable resource depletion, 
pollution or increased entropy had occurred as a result of that same economic activity 
elsewhere in the global ecosystem. The evidence does not show this. 
On the mainstream view, national economies are looked at in isolation and 
there is assumed to be no limit to their potential growth.  This is because external 
impacts are simply disregarded, just as future impacts are discounted.xxxiv This reflects 
the traditional liberal political perspective which sees the international order in terms 
of relations between discrete nation-states, each rationally pursuing its own interest.  
Cosmopolitans do not share this perspective, and thus have little reason, as far 
as I can see, to accept the cornucopian presumption or rely on its future vindication, 
given the evident need here and now to begin addressing – for reasons of both 
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ecology and justice – the overarching problem of ecological debt. Yet contemporary 
liberal cosmopolitans appear to envisage relatively modest reforms that involve a 
greater sharing of the benefits of a liberal economy, rather than take a more probing 
approach to the sustainability of those benefits themselves.  If I am right about this, 
then cosmopolitanism represents a challenge to liberalism of a more thoroughgoing 
kind than liberal cosmopolitans believe.  
 
4. Critical questions about the liberal ethos 
Historically, the development of liberalism attended and served the development of 
the modern nation-state. Today, there is a widely held view that liberalism provides 
the normative principles not only for international moral and political cooperation, but 
for a cosmopolitan world order. However, I think we need to consider more carefully 
the extent to which cosmopolitanism really can be seen as an extension of liberal 
normative principles. 
One of the few voices raising questions about this assumption is that of Katrin 
Flikschuh: “If liberal economic policy has significantly contributed to the production 
of extreme wealth in some parts of the earth and extreme poverty in other parts, can 
we continue to assert with confidence liberalism’s ‘moral universalism’?”  She 
believes this discrepancy should lead us at the very least “to ask whether liberal 
theory is capable of delivering, politically and economically, on its universalistic 
moral aspirations.”xxxv  Liberal cosmopolitans tend to treat these moral aspirations as 
separable from their “contingent” material conditions of possibility. Flikschuh thinks 
we should find this more surprising than we have become accustomed to do when 
discussing proposed reforms to the global institutional order: 
“if the current global order is a major contributor to global poverty, and if the 
existence of that order turns out also to have been an essential prerequisite to the 
achievement of the liberal good life in mature liberal societies, how can the 
proposed reforms be expected to result in the widening of access to a life-style the 
possibility of which presupposes the global status quo?”xxxvi 
She thinks liberals may rather have lost sight of the material presuppositions of 
liberalism, and the implications of these: 
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 “Arguably, what is depicted in current liberal theorising as the individual quest for 
the critically examined good life, is observed by the global poor as an attractively 
high standard of living. … It is arguably these more material aspects of the liberal 
good life, rather than the promise of sharpening one’s powers of critical reflection, 
that very many of the materially deprived global poor not only aspire to, but that 
they may also – given global terms of production – claim to have a just stake 
in.”xxxvii 
The trouble is that the liberal good life is expensive, she observes, and once the 
economic costs of making it more widely available are counted, liberal thinkers, 
mindful of the “strains of commitment,” frequently shrink back from promoting its 
universalisation. But if liberals are partial and selective about the values and 
obligations to be universalised, this raises critical questions about the extent to which 
cosmopolitanism should be conceived in terms of the universalisation of liberal values 
at all:  “ … is it not more reasonable to accept that institutional reform is likely to 
impose new moral constraints – the constraint upon citizens of the West, for example, 
to lower their material expectations so as indeed to enable distant others ‘to meet their 
basic needs with dignity’?”xxxviii  This suggestion can be reinforced by considering the 
ecological constraints on the required resources.  
To meet global challenges, it is arguable that we – those of us currently over-
consuming – require the inculcation of an ethic, an ethos, of restraint to accompany 
and underpin the recognition of our obligations to reduce our demands on resources.  
With this ethos we would “tread lightly” on the earth, and live in a way that is “simple 
in means, rich in ends,” with a focus on satisfactions derived from being as opposed 
to having. This characteristically “green” conception of the good life is arguably in 
humans’ own enlightened interest, entailing the happiness that comes with exercise of 
our faculties and capacities rather than sacrifice. An ethos of restraint can foster the 
resourcefulness that makes such activities their own reward rather than something 
experienced as a cost or sacrifice.xxxix An ethos of restraint, though, has in turn to be 
deeply grounded in a sense, and principles, of justice.  It certainly should not be 
confused with the self-righteousness of the affluent ascetic, who, from a position of 
material security, can demonstrate how easy it is to “dematerialize” their interests. 
From the point of view of the have-nots, it is a perverse mockery to be shown by 
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well-off people how they can “do without.”  The imperative of restraint, then, is a 
matter both of the good and of the right.xl 
Liberalism in many respects is an ethos of non-restraint.xli  The way the liberal 
emphasis on the value of individual freedom is placed, in particular, does not clearly 
or directly tend to promote the kind of collective restraint that global environmental 
justice would seem to require.  In pursuit of their traditional socio-economic goals, 
liberals have embraced a constitutive encouragement of the pursuit of individual self-
interest as the engine of aggregate economic development, something whose benefits 
in due course supposedly will (or can be made to) trickle down to all. We are 
accustomed to thinking of our liberties as achievements, but the fact that they were 
achieved by people in the past and at some cost to others tends to be passed over in 
contemporary versions of the implicit idealism as manifest in various “win-win” ideas 
such as that as the possibility of adequate trickle down of wealth and of “sustainable 
development.”  It is as if there is a line tacitly drawn in the sand: we want the rest of 
the world to be able to achieve what we have achieved; but we are not going to enter 
questions about relinquishing any of what we have.  
This position is defensible with regard to human rights relating to security and 
respect of the person – rights to non-zero-sum goods that we should not give up at all. 
Indeed, the one clear principle of restraint provided by liberalism (and which protects 
such rights) is the harm principle, and this – in virtue of its negative tenor – is readily 
universalisable and can unproblematically be extended globally.  But what of the non-
non-zero-sum goods, those directly carrying costs, that are also required for the more 
complete fulfilment of human rights – including subsistence, livelihoods and adequate 
living conditions, including an adequate environment?  Some theorists believe these 
can also be secured by applying the harm principle, albeit in novel ways, including as 
a guide for international institutional reform: both with regard to environmental harms 
(as, for instance, some libertarian defences of using property rights for environmental 
protection do) and with regard to global injustices (as Pogge has recently argued 
regarding the avoidable harms caused under existing international institutional 
arrangements). 
Refraining from harm, however, is only part of an ethos of restraint.  For 
restraint in our use of ecological space means not only taking care not to harm others, 
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but also re-evaluating the nature and extent of the benefits we ourselves draw from 
our activities, even when these do not immediately or obviously precipitate some 
harm on others. If the rich are to retain what they already have, then the only way the 
poor can become better off is by increasing aggregate pressure on the world’s 
resources; yet its ecology will not sustain this pressure.  Taking this insight seriously, 
its normative implications should be deeply unsettling for those who envisage 
cosmopolitanism entailing the globalisation of liberality. Unless they simply resort to 
faith in the possibility of indefinite material expansion through technological 
innovation, they have to face up to the implications of recognizing that, from an 
adequate normative perspective, what we today have is not, in fact, non-negotiably 
ours. 
If any aspect of this is found “illiberal,” we should not assume, without further 
ado, that simply finding it so amounts to an objection.  I have suggested elsewhere we 
should be cautious about any commitment to substantive liberal values when these 
conflict with ecological ones.xlii  This is not to suggest rejecting all the values liberal 
espouse. For instance, as Andrew Dobson argues, it may be that a conception of 
political citizenship embracing an ecological orientation has as its principal virtues 
“the liberal ones of reasonableness and a willingness to accept the force of the better 
argument and procedural legitimacy.”xliii But while reasonableness and a willingness 
to accept the force of the better argument may be values liberals typically espouse, I 
am not sure they are peculiarly liberal values. To think that liberalism has a monopoly 
of reasonableness could prove, in today’s world, to be a dangerous illusion. 
Liberalism has indeed played an important historical role in establishing and 
institutionalising such principles as tolerance, freedom, civil rights, procedural 
equality, and non-discrimination. Yet one can hold these principles to be dear while 
also believing, say, that all property should be communally owned, or that economic 
growth should be severely constrained, or that citizens have as full and dense a set of 
obligations as they have rights. Reasonableness does not entail an obligation to 
tolerate the intolerable.  Non-restraint is, from a green point of view, intolerable.  The 
planet cannot tolerate it; the worst off cannot tolerate its effects; future sufferers from 
humanly induced ecological crises will not be able to tolerate it either. 
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 In short, then, it seems to me there is good reason to challenge more actively 
and determinedly the assumption that cosmopolitanism represents a seamless 
continuation of liberalism. 
 
Conclusion  
Liberalism has fostered vitally important norms with its commitment to democracy 
and human rights, and I do not assume that democracy and human rights can 
necessarily flourish in just any non-liberal political context. What I do suggest is that 
our thinking about how such norms can be promoted in the altered context of a 
globally interdependent, geopolitically re-orientated, and ecologically constrained 
world should take its bearing from a more radically open-spirited assessment of the 
new context.  The project of political theorists to see about extending domestic 
theories has of course needed to be tried – since not all questions are new and 
inherited wisdom may have much to teach. But I think we also need to free ourselves 
from any assumption that this approach will suffice. We need to be open to the more 
radical questions thrown up.  This means some “thinking outside the box” of 
liberalism, and a readiness to reframe questions in new ways.  So while I am not 
implying that all the values and assumptions of liberalism should be negated, I do 
think we need to be open to the possibility that some might.  Approaching them in a 
spirit of immanent criticism, we can consider the kind of direction in which this might 
lead.  
The idea that an immanent critique of liberalism leads in the direction of 
socialism is to be found in the work of influential political theorists of the twentieth 
century.  If socialism can be arrived at as an immanent goal of liberalism – because 
the realisation of individual freedom for all actually requires socialised material 
justice as a precondition – then we now also need to recognize that material justice for 
all has its own precondition, namely, the integrity of the compendious resources of the 
biophysical world.xliv  Thus if the immanent critique of liberalism leads in the 
direction of socialism, then the immanent critique of socialism leads in the direction 
of what may be called ecologism  – or, given that this term may be understood in 
different ways – ecological socialism. 
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We need to recognize rather than evade the extent to which existing 
international institutions are complicit in the logic of capital accumulation.xlv For it is 
this which so structures global economic imperatives as to render the human 
calamities associated with ecological debt a systemic outcome and not only a moral 
failure. The injustices which existing institutions preside over should not be assumed 
to be simply incidental failings of an otherwise just system. 
Furthermore, if liberals rightly emphasise the value of peace and stability in 
the global order, then we should also be concerned about the serious potential threats 
to global stability posed by “ecological insecurity.”  For the same circumstances that 
can be condemned as “ecological debt” in a discourse of justice are liable increasingly 
to occasion security threats, as already evidenced in growing conflicts over resources. 
Liberalism – with its focus on “ecological modernization” and the win-win-win 
interpretation of sustainable development – would not appear to have an adequate 
theoretical apparatus for recognizing why such conflicts are becoming more 
pervasive.  
Yet departing from liberalism is not to depart from the goals of 
cosmopolitanism. In particular, we can readily affirm a recognizably cosmopolitan 
conception of universal rights and global justice.  The basics of justice, on the 
conception referred to here, include a universal right of access to the necessary means 
for a decent life. I take it as axiomatic that there is this fundamental right: for if there 
were not, then the very idea of human rights would be hollow; and if we could not 
rely conceptually and normatively on the idea of human rights as a touchstone for 
ideas of justice, I doubt we could talk both cogently and persuasively about global 
justice at all.  As a material premise, I take it that the means of life necessarily and 
importantly include biophysical resources; biophysical resources, compendiously, can 
be referred to by the term “ecological space.” From these premises it follows that a 
right of each human to a sufficient allocation of ecological space is a human right.xlvi 
This right is what I believe cosmopolitanism commits us to as a matter of 
justice. Whether liberalism does, I am not so sure. Perhaps what most crucially has to 
be debated is whether taking this right seriously means according it priority over any 
mere right of property that conflicts with it.xlvii   
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Earlier versions of this article were presented at seminars of International Politics 
and Political Theory research groups at the University of Edinburgh, and at the 
Centre for the Study of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham. I am grateful 
for comments from participants, as well from Carol Gould and Piki Ish-Shalom 
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